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Abstract—A method to determine entry and exit points or
paths of DDoS attack traffic flows into and out of network
domains is proposed. We observe valid source addresses seen by
routers from sampled traffic under non-attack conditions. Under
attack conditions, we detect route anomalies by determining
which routers have been used for unknown source addresses,
to construct the attack paths. We consider deployment issues
and show results from simulations to prove the feasibility of our
scheme. We then implement our Traceback mechanism in C++
and more realistic experiments are conducted. The experiments
show that accurate results, with high traceback speed of a few
seconds, are achieved. Compared to existing techniques, our
approach is non-intrusive, not requiring any changes to the
Internet routers and data packets. Precise information regarding
the attack is not required allowing a wide variety of DDoS attack
detection techniques to be used. The victim is also relieved from
the traceback task during an attack. The scheme is simple and
efficient, allowing for a fast traceback, and scalable due to the
distribution of processing workload.
Index Terms—Distributed Denial of Service, IP Traceback.
I. INTRODUCTION
CURRENT networks do not usually perform any form ofauthentication on the source IP address. This is exploited
by many Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [1],
where the attackers use spoofed source addresses to hide
their identity and location. Some service providers do perform
ingress filtering at access routers to check for valid source IP ,
but this is not completely effective. The Spoofer Internet-wide
active measurement Project [2] concluded in 2005 that approx-
imately 360 million addresses and 4600 autonomous systems
were vulnerable to spoofing, and concerted attacks employing
spoofing remain a serious concern. In 2006, backscatter anal-
ysis [3] was conducted where attack traffic using IP spoofing
was captured. It shows that over a period of 3 years from 2001
to 2004, 22 collected distinct traces revealed 68,700 attacks
on over 34,700 distinct Internet hosts. Traceback mechanisms
[4]–[14] have been proposed to trace the true source of the
attackers to stop the attack at the point nearest to its source
in order to reduce waste of network resources and to try to
determine the identity of the attackers to be able to prosecute
or take other actions against them.
In infrastructure traceback schemes, the network is responsi-
ble for generating and evaluating traceback state information
to construct the attack graph of the routers through which
attack traffic is passing. In IP Logging [4], intermediate routers
log the invariant portion of the IP header (20 bytes) and the
first 8 bytes of the payload of all IP packets. Hashing is
then performed on the 28-byte information obtained above,
followed by a Bloom filter processing to reduce the storage
requirement. The logs are retrieved from various routers when
traceback for the path taken by any single IP packet is initiated.
Given a copy of an attack packet, and an approximate time of
receipt, it is, in theory, possible to generate a similar hash and
search router logs to determine the attack graph. However, the
overheads of generating and storing even a 28 byte hash can
be rather high so IP Logging is not done in most networks.
In the end-host traceback schemes, potential victim hosts
maintain the traceback state information. In IP Marking [5],
[9]–[11], [13], [14], intermediate routers along the path taken
by the packets mark their addresses into the packet with
a predefined probability. The victim of the attack can then
examine the information found in the attack packets so as to
construct the attack path. In ICMP Traceback (ITrace) [6],
an intermediate router probabilistically generates an ITrace
message for each IP packet it processes, and sends it to the
same final destination of the IP packet. The victim of the
attack can therefore use the ITrace messages to construct
the attack path. Various enhancements have been proposed
to ITrace to improve performance [7], [8], [12], which are
discussed in more detail in Section VIII. However, all the
above-mentioned traceback schemes require that the attack
packets are distinguishable from legitimate packets. This is
due to the need for the identification of an attack signature in
the packets to initiate and perform traceback. IP marking and
ITrace (and its variants) also require changes to be made to
the routers to allow for participation in the traceback process.
Standard routing protocols perform packet forwarding based
on the destination IP address in the packets so packets belong-
ing to a particular source-destination pair follow a relatively
static path as routing tables are not updated very frequently
under normal conditions. When an attacker spoofs a legitimate
user’s source address, the packet may pass through routers
which are not on the normal source-destination routing path
and this anomaly can be used to determine the attack path.
Our method builds and maintains caches of valid source
addresses for routers in the network from sampled traffic under
non-attack conditions. Under attack conditions, we determine
which routers have been used for unknown source addresses to
construct the attack graph within an administrative domain. We
propose two approaches of our scheme: Network Segmentation
Based (NSB) and Strategic Points Based (SPB). In the NSB
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are assigned to the distributed White List (WL) Caching
Device and the Traceback Manager consolidates information
received from these devices to generate the attack graph. In
the SPB approach, instead of covering the whole network,
traffic sampling is performed in strategic routers in the network
where incoming and outgoing traffic will definitely traverse.
Therefore, the number of sampling points and packets are
reduced, resulting in reduction of processing workload and
overhead traffic. Thus the Traceback Manager and WL caching
device functionalities can co-exist in the same system, elimi-
nating the need for information dissemination. We have also
defined an extension for inter-domain support to identify the
network point nearest to the attack source. The strengths
of this scheme are its scalability due to the distribution of
processing workload and speed due to the simple computation
for the attack graph construction. The elimination of the
need to make modifications to the routers, victim and data
packets to support traceback, unlike existing techniques, allow
the scheme to be “non-intrusive”. In addition, we analysed
the scheme, proposed enhancements to it and considered the
deployment issues.
Section II of the paper presents the design objectives and
key assumptions. Section III describes our traceback scheme.
Section IV explains the deployment considerations. Simula-
tions and experiments conducted are presented in Section
V and VI, respectively. Section VII elaborates on security
threats and the limitations of our approach, with Section
VIII discussing related work and comparisons with existing
techniques, followed by the conclusions in Section IX.
II. DESIGN OBJECTIVES AND KEY ASSUMPTION
A. Design Objectives
Our design is based on the following objectives:
• As changes to the Internet infrastructure raise confor-
mance issues, modifications to the Internet infrastructure
should not be required.
• Methods, such as IP Marking [5], [9]–[11], [13], [14],
require information to be placed in the original data
packets. However, as there is no unused field in the
IP packets, fields reserved for other purposes, such as
the identification field for fragmentation, have to be
used instead. This could result in overwriting existing
information and packet corruption, so changes to the
original data packets should not be required.
• During a DDoS attack, the victim would be overwhelmed
from the attack traffic. Therefore, no additional “burden”
should be placed on the victim when performing trace-
back during an attack.
• Simple and fast algorithms for tracing of routers carrying
attack traffic are necessary to identify the furthest attack
source points when an attack is ongoing so as to carry
out mitigation. [15] showed that 50% and 80% of attacks
last for less than 10 and 30 minutes, respectively.
• Traceback mechanisms are triggered by attack detection
mechanisms. Existing schemes require precise informa-
tion on the attack packets, such as attack signatures, to
differentiate between legitimate and attack packets and
retrieve traceback information from the latter. As brute-
force DDoS attacks could flood the victim with seemingly
legitimate traffic, identifying an attack signature of the
data packets may not be possible so should not be a
prerequisite for the traceback methods.
B. Key Assumption
Our design makes the key assumption that end-to-end routes
are relatively stable. Analysis of 40,000 end-to-end route
measurements conducted using repeated “traceroutes” between
37 Internet sites, is reported in [16]. Two distinct views
of route stability, prevalence and persistence, were studied.
Prevalence refers to the probability that a certain route is
encountered (if a route is observed, how probable are we to
observe it again in the future). Persistence refers to routes
remaining unchanged over a long period of time (if a route is
observed at time t, how long before it may change). In [16],
routes were reduced to three different levels of granularity,
namely host (each route as a sequence of Internet hostnames),
city (as a sequence of geographical cities), and AS (as a
sequence of Autonomous Systems). Prevalence of a dominant
route (that is, it appears most often) is computed as the ratio
of the number of times the dominant route is observed to the
total number of traceroutes measuring a particular path. The
median value of prevalence is 82%, 97% and 100% at host,
city and AS granularity respectively. Therefore, in general, it
was concluded that Internet paths were strongly dominated
by a single route. It was shown that the time periods over
which routes persist demonstrate a wide variation, ranging
from seconds to days. However, over 60% of the Internet paths
had routes persisting for either days or weeks.
Routing stability based on data captured from the National
Internet Measurement Infrastructure (NIMI) and a set of
189 public traceroute servers was studied in [17]. Of the
NIMI paths, 78% always exhibited the same route, and 86%
of the routes had a prevalence of 90% or higher. For the
public servers, the corresponding figures are 73% and 85%
respectively. It was shown that very often, routes persist for at
least a day, but in general, 1/3 of the Internet routes and 1/6
of the NIMI routes are short-lived.
A study in 2002 [18] investigated whether routing fluctua-
tions caused by the instability of the small fraction of Internet
routes affect a significant portion of the Internet traffic. It was
concluded that the vast majority of Internet routing instability
stems from only a small number of unpopular destinations.
Popular destinations, which are responsible for the bulk of the
Internet, were shown to have remarkably stable routes lasting
days or weeks at times, probably due to the fact that they have
reliable and well-managed connections to the Internet.
The above studies showed that Internet routes exhibit rela-
tively high stability in terms of prevalence and persistence.
This satisfies the requirement in our scheme that Internet
routes would not change erratically and frequently such that
the cached information in the white list becomes obsolete.
Therefore, we can assume that Internet routes taken by the
data packets under normal conditions are generally stable.
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DETERMINATION
Standard routing protocols perform packet forwarding based
on the destination IP address in the packets so packets belong-
ing to a particular source-destination pair follow a relatively
static path as routing tables are not updated very frequently
under normal conditions. When an attacker spoofs a legitimate
user’s source address, the packet may pass through routers
which are not on the normal source-destination routing path
and this anomaly can be used to determine the attack path.
Fig. 1: Route Anomaly
In Figure 1, we show that if node A spoofs node B’s address,
an ”incorrect” path via anomalous intermediate routers can be
detected as B to C traffic should flow through R3 and R4, not
R1 and R2. By performing source IP address validation checks
on whether transit packets are supposed to arrive at particular
routers, these packets could be identified as from legitimate
or illegitimate users, with a low false positive rate (studied
in Section 6). Therefore, even in the event that DDoS attacks
constitute seemingly legitimate packets, they would still be
traceable.
In our scheme, the routers in the network send sampled
transit traffic flow information, using standard flow sampling
and reporting mechanisms such as Netflow [19], PSAMP [20]–
[22], and IPFIX [23], [24], to their assigned White List (WL)
caching device. The flow information includes the source
address and port, destination address and port in the original
data packets, and the packet’s next hop address. In the cache,
each record will consist of the above fields, the address of the
router that sent the export and time of receipt.
The WL caching devices will update the white lists for the
routers during the learning stage (that is, when there is no
ongoing DDoS attack). Therefore, spoofed source addresses
are prevented from being included in the caches. We assume
a DDoS attack would be detected using mechanisms such as
TCP SYN flood [25], or MULTOPS [26].
During the attack, traffic sampling at the routers continues
and this information is sent to the WL caching devices.
However, the white list generation and updates are suspended
upon attack detection. The WL caching devices search for
mismatches between the sampled traffic and cache data (that
is, flows from previously seen sources going through wrong
routers which indicate spoofed addresses), and generate partial
attack graphs which are sent to the Traceback Manager to
generate the full attack graphs. We present two approaches of
our traceback scheme, Network Segmentation Based (NSB)
and Strategic Points Based (SPB), in the next two sections.
A. Network Segmentation Based (NSB) Approach
In the NSB approach, the network in an administrative
domain is divided into segments. Each segment of routers
is assigned a WL caching device. During an attack, the
Traceback Manager queries the WL caching devices by re-
questing them to check for specific source/destination ad-
dress pairs. The WL caching devices send information to
the Traceback Manager as to whether the flows with the
specified source/destination address pairs have passed through
the routers they are in charge of, and if these flows are
expected or anomalous. This approach is useful in the case of
DDoS attacks whereby the attack signature or attack pattern
is identifiable. The detection mechanisms are signature-based
and are able to distinguish between legitimate and attack
traffic. They are then able to provide information regarding
the suspicious source/destination address pairs. However, in
the event that attack traffic constitutes seemingly legitimate
packets, an attack signature would not be present. This short-
coming is similar to the existing traceback mechanisms which
require distinguishing between legitimate and attack packets to
conduct tracing. Another problem is the wide range of spoofed
addresses and that the chosen source/destination address might
not have been captured by all the routers during sampling.
Therefore, a set of suspicious source/destination address pairs
has to be determined. Nevertheless, this method allows for fast
mismatch checking in the event that such attack information
is available.
Another solution is to rely on the continuous arrival of
flow exports from the routers at the WL caching devices
during an attack stage to perform traceback. The WL caching
devices will perform checking to identify traffic flows which
are not supposed to arrive at the routers they are in charge of
(that is, performing router address, traffic source address and
destination address matching checks against the white lists).
The WL caching devices will then construct partial attack
graphs based on these observed anomalies and send them to
the Traceback Manager. The Traceback Manager will proceed
to perform the complete attack graph generation.
In this case, some routers may see packets from new
sources that are not in their white lists which are legitimate
requests rather than attack packets. However, such legitimate
requests would constitute a relatively minimal percentage of
mismatches in comparison to the attack traffic. In the case
of attack traffic going through a router, an excessive high
number of mismatches would be observed due to the wide
range of spoofed addresses and high volume of attack traffic.
However, if the attack traffic does not pass through a particular
router, the observed number of unknown source addresses due
to new legitimate requests will be comparatively small. Our
solution is to set a percentage threshold on the number of
‘unknown’ source addresses seen by a particular router to take
into consideration new legitimate requests. The percentage
threshold affects the false positives and varies among different
organisations. The chosen value or range should depend on
the network services provided by the organisations and their
normal traffic profile of the arrival rate of new legitimate
requests.
We present an example scenario in Figure 2, where we
assume the legitimate and attack traffic enter the network
through different ingress routers so as to simplify the ex-
planation. We will present simulation scenarios of mixed
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traffic coming in through ingress routers, in Section 7.6.
As shown, the legitimate traffic is coming from addresses
IP1 to IP120. Of these, IP1 to IP100 have visited the site
before the attack, whereas IP101 to IP120 are new legitimate
requests. Therefore, the WL Caching Device 1 would only
have records of IP1-IP100/victim address pairs. Although,
mismatches were also observed by WL Caching Device 1
corresponding to routers R1 and R3 “being asked” to forward
packets belonging to flows from unknown sources, the number
of these mismatches is extremely small.
In the example, the attackers are spoofing the source address
of the packets using a wide address range from IP1 to IP10000.
Therefore, R2, R4, R5 and R6 would see a sharp rise in the
number of new traffic flows. WL Caching Device 1 and 2 will
observe a high number of mismatches for the sampled traffic
from these routers to the victim. They will then construct the
partial attack graphs of R5–>R6 and R2–>R4 respectively,
and send these graphs to the Traceback Manager for forming
the complete attack graph. In addition, we assume that the
Traceback Manager has knowledge of the network topology
and the entry and exit points of the network.
B. Strategic Points Based (SPB) Approach
One of the main goals of conducting traceback is to locate
the points closest to the attack sources so as to carry out mit-
igation such as effective filtering or rate-limiting. Therefore,
instead of having coverage of all routers within a domain such
as a campus network, it would suffice to identify the strategic
points, where incoming and outgoing traffic will definitely
traverse, and perform monitoring on them instead. To pin-
point the strategic points, we firstly classify attackers into
internal (for example, zombies within the victim network)
and external attackers. To trace external attackers, the strategic
points to perform monitoring or traffic sampling would be at
the ingress routers. However, for the internal attackers, we
have to know the network topology. We group the internal
nodes as intermediate routers and access routers. Monitoring
is conducted on the group of access routers.
By reducing the number of routers participating in the
traffic sampling and flow exporting, the workload and over-
head traffic is significantly reduced. This is a very important
enhancement considering that traceback is to be performed
during the occurrence of a DDoS attack whereby the victim’s
network is under heavy load. Another advantage of this
approach is that due to the small number of routers involved,
a single Traceback Manager with built-in WL caching device
functionalities could be in charge of the whole network,
therefore consolidating the information storage and processing
at a central point. This would allow faster processing and a
global view of the traffic flows in the domain, making it easier
to identify anomalous flows.
IV. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Our method allows for inter-domain support for both the
NSB and SPB approaches. In the case of NSB, after construc-
tion of the attack graph at the Traceback Manager, it is able
to identify the entry point/s of the attack traffic flows into
the network. It would then communicate with the Traceback
Manager/s of those networks with connecting traffic to these
entry point/s, sending them information of the victim’s IP
address. Assuming these networks can perform traceback, the
same attack graph construction process will be carried out at
these networks and the completed graph will be sent back to
the Traceback Manager at the victim network. This facilitates
tracing to the nearest possible point to the source of the
attack. In the case of SPB, the similar function performed by
the WL caching device is built into the Traceback Manager.
Instead of the whole attack graph, the Traceback Managers
of the co-operating networks only report the ingress points
in their networks, where attack traffic flows are detected.
Therefore, SPB would be a more feasible solution as co-
operating networks would not have to disclose their internal
network topology.
Our traceback method is non-intrusive, in that it does
not require changes to the routers assisting in the traceback
process. Built-in traffic sampling/monitoring and exporting
tools in routers such as Netflow [19], PSAMP [20]–[22] and
IPFIX [23], [24] are used to sample and report the required
information to the WL caching devices. If such tools are not
built into the routers, we can instead make use of monitoring
devices by installing them along the network paths.
If the learning process is not suspended in time, records
of the attack traffic flow might make it into the white list,
thereby corrupting it. The decision as to when to stop the
learning process is dependent on the DDoS attack detection
mechanism, as it triggers traceback. A solution is to create a
separate buffer for the white list. Records of sampled traffic
are first written in to the buffer. The interval for the buffer
to confirm entries into the white list cache would then be
based on the attack detection speed. For example, if the attack
5detection mechanism takes x secs to detect an attack and the
triggering delay (that is, time to inform Traceback Manager
of the attack) takes y secs, the buffer flushing interval would
be x+y secs for the SPB approach. For the NSB approach, we
would also need to take into account the time taken for the
Traceback Manager to inform the WL caching devices of the
attack.
Another important issue is when do we reactivate the learn-
ing process, as we have to make sure that only legitimate traffic
is present. Therefore, the detection mechanism which detects
the attack and triggers traceback or the response mechanism
responsible for mitigating the attack has to ensure that the
attack has stopped or successfully been mitigated, to trigger
the reactivation of the learning process.
The size of the white list is an important issue to be
considered during deployment. For NSB, although all routers
are to be monitored, we distribute the work load across
multiple WL caching devices. In SPB, the number of routers
to be monitored is significantly cut down to allow the use of a
single WL cache in the Traceback Manager. As an estimation
of the white list size, we referred to [27] which shows that
Amazon.com experienced 630,000 visitors in a single hour on
its busiest day in 2003. By having a white list cache for a
protected server in an IPv4 network, each record would take
up 8 bytes of storage (that is, 4 bytes for the source address
and another 4 bytes for the router). This converts to 2.4MB
of storage for a white list containing the past half hour of
records.
V. SIMULATIONS
We have carried out simulations to study the performance
of our traceback method. Due to the advantages of SPB over
NSB approach, we implemented the SPB approach in ns-2
[28] and investigated the performance of the SPB approach
during an attack.
During the learning phase, nodes generate legitimate traffic
to the target/victim and the Traceback Manager builds the
white list. When the attack traffic is started, the white list up-
dating is suspended and traceback is started, but the legitimate
nodes continue to generate traffic at a probability (to simulate
random traffic). The attackers spoof the source addresses in
the attack packets based on a range which also includes the
legitimate nodes.
Fig. 3: Traceback using SPB Approach
The network topology is shown in Figure 3. We have 100
attackers (A1 to A100) and 120 legitimate nodes (N1 to
N120). The attackers send attack traffic with randomly spoofed
addresses in the range of 1 to 10000 (which includes the
addresses of the legitimate nodes). The strategic points are R1,
R2, R3 and R4, which are the entry points to the network.
The links from the legitimate nodes and the attackers into
the network are set to 10Mbps with a propagation delay of
30ms to reflect the Internet delays. The internal links are set
to 100Mbps with a propagation delay of 10ms.
During the learning phase, each legitimate node N1 to N100,
sent traffic to the victim V, at the rate of 5 pkts/sec. R1 to R4
sampled this traffic with probability 0.01 and sent sampled data
to the Traceback Manager. The learning period was 20 secs.
We ran 3 sets of simulations where the attack started at the
20th sec with rates of 20, 50 or 100 pkts/sec, per attack node.
During the 1.5 sec long attack, all legitimate nodes (including
N101 to N120 which were simulating new legitimate requests)
generated traffic with a “decide to send” probability of 0.51 at
a rate of 5 pkts/sec per node.
Attack t ms 0.5 sec 1 sec 1.5 sec 1.6 sec
Rate (attack
pkts/sec stopped)
20 R1(1) R1(5) R1(11) R1(15) Same
R3(1) R3(4) R3(13) R3(17)
R4(1)
50 R1(1) R1(15) R1(24) R1(34) R1(36)
R3(1) R3(10) R3(26) R3(29) R3(41)
R4(1) R4(1) R4(2) R4(2)
100 R1(1) R1(23) R1(43) R1(69) R1(73)
R3(2) R3(24) R3(56) R3(91) R3(95)
R2(1) R2(1)
TABLE I: Mismatched packets
R1 and R3 were successfully detected to be carrying attack
traffic. Table I shows the statistics of the number of mismatch
packets traversing the routers detected by the Traceback Man-
ager. The time stated is from the start of the attack and the
results are displayed as RX(Y), where X refers to the router’s
ID and Y refers to the number of mismatch packets detected.
The time, t, taken to first detect mismatch packets for both R1
and R3, was 140ms, 80ms and 70ms for attack rates of 20, 50
and 100 pkts/sec, respectively. At t ms, a total of 3, 3 and 4
sampled packets were received by the Traceback Manager, of
which 2, 2 and 3 were mismatch packets, for the attack rates
of 20, 50 and 100 pkts/sec, respectively.
The results show that there were false positives detected. R2
(for attack rate of 100 pkts/sec) and R4 (for both attack rates of
20 and 50 pkts/sec) were detected to be carrying attack traffic
due to mismatch packets detected. These mismatch packets
were sampled from the new legitimate traffic not found in
the white list. We also observe that as time progresses, false
positives started appearing (e.g. 1 mismatch packet for R4
at 0.5 sec when attack rate is 50 pkts/sec). However, the
difference between the number of mismatch packets sampled
for R1,R3 and R2,R4 widens too. At 0.5 sec, the smallest-
1Legitimate traffic during an attack is generated at 5 pkts/sec. However, a
random generator is used to determine whether to generate each packet, with
a probability of 0.5.
6gap ratio (worst case) was 1/10. At 1.6 sec (measurement
taken at 1.6 sec to wait for packets due to propagation delay
even though attack was stopped at 1.5 sec), the smallest-gap
ratio was 1/15, 1/18 and 1/73 for attack rates of 20, 50 and
100 pkts/sec. Threshold values can be set so that these false
positives are ignored.
The traceback mechanism was implemented in C++ and
deployed in an experimental testbed within the EU funded
Diadem Firewall project [29]. Even though a major Internet
service provider was one of the partners, we were unable to
install the system within a large operational network as the
service provider would not permit any DDoS attacks in their
network. Therefore, a rather unrealistic small scale test was
conducted to test the feasibility of the system and that it could
be implemented to work with the router monitoring elements.
The traceback scheme was designed to be used with and
triggered by DDoS attack detection mechanisms, so as to
perform attack traffic entry and exit point/path locating. To
conduct more realistic and large scale experiments, we studied,
designed and implemented advanced DDoS attack tools, and
attack detection and response mechanisms. The system which
incorporated the modules to carry out widely observed DDoS
attacks (e.g. TCP SYN flooding) [30], the attack detection
modules [31], [32] and our traceback module, is called the
DARE (DDoS Adaptive ResponsE) system. Therefore, using
DARE, we were able to conduct more realistic experiments in
the Emulab environment [33] as described in the next section.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We ported DARE with the integrated Traceback module to
the Emulab machines to carry out the experiments in this
section. DARE is a distributed adaptive DDoS mitigation
system composed of modular traffic flow monitoring and
aggregating tools, attack detectors and responses, and system
managers. Emulab is a large-scale network testbed, giving
researchers in the fields of networking and distributed systems
a wide range of environments to develop, debug, and evaluate
their systems. It allows researchers to specify an arbitrary
network topology, giving a controllable environment, including
PC nodes with full ”root” access, running an operating system
of choice.
The Traceback mechanism was evaluated based on the
following criteria.
• Correct execution of the triggering function of Traceback
(that is, interoperability with the attack detection module)
• High accuracy or correctness; Traceback should return
correct results as to which routers are forwarding attack
traffic
• High speed of the tracing, which means returning results
within seconds is desirable
In our experiments, we carried out TCP SYN attacks as
these are one of the most prominent DDoS attacks [30]
and typically use address spoofing, presenting the need for
Traceback.
Figure 4 shows the experimental network topology and
location of the deployed modules. Nodes 10, 39, 21 and
27 are edge routers at the source networks (due to the
Fig. 4: Experimental Network Topology
TCP SYN attack detection module implemented in DARE,
being a source-end based detection mechanism). The Versatile
montoring toolkit (VERMONT), which are network monitors
configured to capture and/or aggregate traffic packets [34] are
deployed on these edge routers.
The traffic packets or flow information from VERMONT is
then exported to the Traffic Flow and Packet Analysis System
(TOPAS) [35], a framework for the reception and real-time
analysis of the network packets and flow information (on
Node 40). TOPAS subscribes to flow information essential for
DARE’s detection modules (also on Node 40) to carry out
analysis to detect various attacks in parallel.
VERMONT modules at the source networks send informa-
tion on outgoing SYN and incoming SYN&ACK packets to
the TCP SYN attack detector for analysis. In a TCP SYN
attack, the difference between the number of the outgoing SYN
and incoming SYN&ACK packets will be very noticeable.
The TCP SYN detector in DARE incorporates a Bloom-based
hashing technique to allow the detection of both conventional
and a new variant of TCP SYN attacks, by only counting
validated SYN&ACK packets [31]. It also incorporates a more
effective Bloom-based Filter to drop attack packets while
protecting legitimate ones at the edge routers.
The Traceback module is triggered after an attack is de-
tected, to perform traceback to identify the closest locations
from the attack sources. The module depends on flow infor-
7mation received from VERMONT modules to update its WL
during non-attack situations and to check for route anomalies
in source and destination IP address pairs during attacks.
The Adaptive System Manager (ASM) is the system coor-
dinator in DARE. Alert messages regarding attacks are sent to
the ASM, which then dispatches appropriate responses to the
response modules, such as the Traceback module. Results and
status information from the response modules are also sent to
the ASM for attack status logging.
The communications of the alert and response in DARE
(between the ASM, detection modules and response mod-
ules) are through Intrusion Detection Message Exchange For-
mat(IDMEF) event messages — an IETF standard which
defines an XML message format for intrusion alerts [36]. In
DARE, the event distribution between the modules is based on
XMLBlaster [37], a publish-subscribe server, where modules
connect to it and subscribe to the events they are interested in.
When an event is generated, the originating module publishes
the event to the XMLBlaster server which in turn forwards it
to those modules that have subscribed to the type of events
(based on event topics). The use of the XMLBlaster for event
distribution allows DARE to scale easily when additional
detection and response modules, or even ASMs, are added.
The network topology was designed and structured in a way
to consider a mixture of scenarios:
• Two networks (10.1.11 and 10.1.4), with one having
a mixture of both attack hosts and legitimate hosts,
while the other one having just legitimate hosts. The two
networks have different source exit points but share the
same network entry point (Node28) into the protected
network. After attack detection, Traceback should suc-
cessfully identify Node 10 as forwarding attack traffic.
As the TCP SYN attack is not mounted from the 10.1.4
network, Traceback should not return its exit point (Node
39) as an attack traffic forwarding router.
• A network (10.1.3) having a mixture of both attack hosts
and new legitimate hosts, with all traffic exiting from
the same source network point and entering the target
network through the same entrance point (Node30). The
exit point at the 10.1.3 network should be identified by
Traceback as forwarding attack traffic.
• A network (10.1.5) having purely legitimate hosts, with
all the traffic exiting from the same exit point at the
source network and entering through the Node32 entrance
point into the target network. In this case, Traceback
should not identify the exit point at the source network
as forwarding attack traffic.
In the topology (Figure 4), Node0 to Node9 were in the
10.1.11 network, Node34 to Node38 in the 10.1.4 network,
Node11 to Node20 in the 10.1.3 network and Node22 to
Node26 in the 10.1.5 network. Node0 to Node4, and Node11
to Node15 were attack hosts, while Node5 to Node9, Node34
to Node38, and Node22 to Node26 were hosts sending le-
gitimate traffic (including setting up TCP connections for
sending data) to the target server. Node16 to Node20 were
hosts configured to send legitimate traffic to the target server
after the attack has started so as to emulate new legitimate
service requests during an ongoing attack. The 2ms delay on
the internal links was set to emulate traffic propagation delays
within internal networks. The 30ms delay on the external links
was to emulate Internet traffic propagation delays. Internal
networks were connected through 100Mbps Ethernet links,
while external links were 1Gbps Ethernet.
Multicast servers were implemented and deployed on all the
source hosts to listen for experimental control instructions, for
example, when to start and stop sending traffic and requests,
what rate to send them at and where to send them to.
Here, we provide an overview of DARE’s basic operations.
When there is no on-going attack, the Traceback module
performs WL learning from received flow records. When a
new flow is observed, it is entered into a non-committed buffer
and resides in the buffer for at least 30 secs. When no DDoS
attack is observed after this period, the flow is then committed
into the WL as a valid legitimate record.
The TCP SYN Attack Detector subscribes to the SYN and
SYN&ACK records to perform bloom-based checking before
updating the counts of the packets received and compute the
attack indicator value using the CUSUM algorithm [38] to
decide if there is an occurrence of a TCP SYN attack. When
an attack is detected, the detector generates an IDMEF Alert
message about the attack to the XMLBlaster server under
an appropriate topic. The ASM and the Traceback response
module that have subscribed to the message topic receive
the IDMEF Alerts from the XMLBlaster server. Triggering
of Traceback and logging are performed by the ASM after
parsing and processing the message.
Fig. 5: TCP SYN Attack Experiment Timeline
In the TCP SYN Attack experiments, our Emulab topology
specification allocated PC3000 type machines to Node10,
Node39, Node21 and Node27, which are running VERMONT.
PC3000 machines have 3GHz 64bit Xeon processor, 800MHz
FSB and 2GB 400MHz DDR2 RAM. We also specified the
allocation of a PC2400c2 type machine to Node40, which is
running the XMLBlaster server, the ASM, and TOPAS with
the detection and response modules. PC2400c2 machines have
2.4GHz 64bit Intel Core2 Duo E6600 processsors and 2GB
800MHz DDR2 RAM. The rest of the nodes are automatically
allocated with either the PC3000 or PC850 type machines.
PC850 machines have 850MHz PentiumIII processor and
512MB PC133 SDRAM. PC3000 and PC850 machines are
running the Fedora Core4 standard Linux Operating System
and PC2400c2 is running the Fedora Core6 standard Linux
Operating System.
Figure 5 shows the timeline of the TCP SYN Attack
experiments. In a real scenario, legitimate traffic can go on for
8hours, days or even months without encountering any attack.
In our experiments, we allocated 2 mins for the legitimate
traffic so that Traceback could learn legitimate traffic flows
and update its WL. As the Traceback buffer was set to a delay
of 30 secs before committing new records, two minutes of
legitimate traffic should be sufficient time for the WL update
process. The attack was set to last for 4 mins, with 2 mins
of overlap with new legitimate traffic. Research showed that
60% and 80% of DDoS attacks last for less than 10 and 30
minutes, respectively [3]. Therefore, the system should be able
to complete traceback within a short time, in this case, within
the first 2 mins. The last 2 mins of overlap with new legitimate
traffic were used to emulate new connection requests. All the
legitimate traffic was stopped 2 mins after the attack to emulate
a real legitimate traffic scenario, where transmissions carry on
even after an attack.
In the experiments, the legitimate hosts started sending TCP
SYN requests to the target server at a rate of around 4 pkts/sec
per host (precise packet rate relied on the time delay between
sending of each packet and was dependent on each individual
system processing speed) and a probability of 0.52, at time
t0. At time t0+2 mins, the attack hosts started sending TCP
SYN requests with randomly spoofed source IP addresses to
the target server at a rate of around 55 pkts/sec. At time t0+4
mins, the new legitimate hosts started sending new TCP SYN
requests to the target server at a rate of around 4 pkts/sec per
host and a probability of 0.5, during the attack. This traffic
was therefore newly observed and had not been ”learnt” by the
Traceback module. At time t0+6 mins, the attack was stopped
and at time t0+8 mins, we stopped the experiments.
The Traceback module was configured to only commit
records into the WL after a buffer clearance period of at least
30 secs to ensure that the detection module has time to detect
an incoming attack, to prevent attack traffic records entering
the WL. When an attack is detected, the detector module
will send a notification message through the XMLBlaster,
to the ASM and the Traceback module to stop the learning
process and compute the Traceback results. The ASM will
perform attack logging. After the ASM receives the Traceback
results, identifying the nodes forwarding attack traffic, the
ASM triggers the filtering at the specific edge routers.
We ran a few rounds of the experiments and the experimen-
tal results were consistently close. We present two sets of the
results as follow.
At time t0, when the legitimate TCP SYN and data traffic
arrived, the Traceback module started to learn the legitimate
traffic. At time t0+2 mins (t1), the attack hosts started sending
TCP SYN flooding packets with randomly spoofed source IP
addresses to the target server. The attack was detected by
the TCP SYN Attack Detector, and a notification message
was sent to the ASM and the Traceback module, at 6 secs
after the start of the attack (t1+6 secs). The Traceback results,
identifying Node21 (refer to Figure 4) as the router forwarding
the attack traffic, was sent to the ASM at t1+8 secs. Further
2Although legitimate traffic is generated at a configured packet rate, it takes
into consideration a 0.5 probability by incorporating a random generator to
determine whether to generate each packet. This is to introduce randomness
into the legitimate traffic generation.
Traceback results, identifying Node10 as the other router
forwarding attack traffic, was sent to the ASM at t1+12
secs. Therefore, traceback was accomplished correctly for both
attack traffic flows in 2 secs and 6 secs.
In the second experiment, the attack was detected by the
TCP SYN Attack Detector, at 5 secs after the start of the
attack (t1+5 secs). The Traceback results, identifying Node10
as the router forwarding the attack traffic, was sent to the ASM
at t1+7 secs. Further Traceback results, identifying Node21 as
the other router forwarding attack traffic, was sent to the ASM
at t1+11 secs. Therefore, the correct traceback results were
returned in 2 secs and 6 secs.
As shown in both experiments, the Traceback mechanism
was able to efficiently and accurately identify the routers
forwarding attack traffic, within seconds. In addition, Node39
and Node27, which were not forwarding attack traffic, were
not identified by the Traceback.
A. Discussion
In Section V, we discussed the ns-2 simulations we per-
formed on the Traceback module. We knew which routers
were forwarding the attack traffic and the first mismatch packet
passing through the routers was detected within msecs in the
simulations. The simulations were carried out to determine
how fast the first mismatch packet was captured and how
to distinguish between attack and new legitimate packets
mismatches to return correct traceback results by the setting
of thresholds.
In the experiments, we do not assume knowledge of which
routers were forwarding attack traffic as that defeats the pur-
pose of tracing back in a real scenario. The correct traceback
results returned in 2 secs to 6 secs in the two experiments
were determined based on threshold checks so that the router
forwarding new legitimate traffic would not be detected as
one with attack traffic traversing it. Mismatched packets at
the router for the target server have to exceed a count of 50
and must also exceed 70% of all the mismatched packets at all
the forwarding routers before being identified as forwarding
attack traffic. The threshold count of 50 mismatched packets
is to ensure that initial burst of new traffic (exceeding the
70% threshold due to initial count of 0 packets) would not
result in erroneous traceback results. In the simulations, we
observed that such a threshold allows differentiation between
attack traffic and new legitimate traffic as flooding attack traffic
will exceed new legitimate traffic by a large amount. Although
lowering the percentage will allow a much faster and correct
traceback, we decided that 70% is a much safer setting with
not much compromise on the traceback speed.
VII. THREAT ANALYSIS AND LIMITATIONS
In this section, we consider the security issues and limita-
tions of our method.
A. Security Considerations
1) Spoofing of IPFIX packets: An attacker might imperson-
ate a monitoring element to send IPFIX packets to the
9collector to inject spoofed addresses into the white list.
Subsequent DDoS attack packets, using these addresses,
can traverse entry points without being identified by
the Traceback mechanism. However, the attacker would
need to know the path the attack packets will be taking
and also what the identification numbers or IP addresses
of the monitoring elements are. Another objective might
be to corrupt the white list so as to let Traceback
wrongly identify an entry point which is allowing in
legitimate traffic and cause self-inflicted DoS. IPFIX
packets from illegitimate sources should be prevented
from being entered into the white list by using authenti-
cated associations between the monitoring elements and
the collector.
2) Spoofing traffic during learning: Before launching an
attack, an attacker might send traffic with spoofed source
addresses at a normal rate in order to get these into
the white list. These IP addresses could then be used in
future attacks and would not be detected as anomalies as
they are in the white list. A solution would be to monitor
for bi-directional flows with established connections. In
this case, only such flow records would be committed
to the white list.
3) Man-in-the-middle attacks: An on-path attacker could
also act as a Man-in-the-middle to change the contents
of IPFIX packets to insert spoofed addresses in the white
list or corrupt it. Traceback would then fail as a result.
To prevent packet modification, Message Authentication
Codes to validate the integrity of the contents of IPFIX
packets can be used.
4) Eavesdropping attacks: On-path attackers can eaves-
drop unencrypted traceback traffic to determine what
addresses are going through which entry points. At-
tackers could then be given legitimate addresses to use
as spoofed addresses. The attackers would have to be
chosen so that the traffic always enters via the “correct”
entry point. Encryption such as IPSec ESP, could be
used to guard the confidentiality of the data.
5) Replay attacks: Studies have shown end-to-end Internet
routes to be relatively stable. However, in the event
of router failures, new routes would be chosen for
packet delivery instead. Therefore, the white list would
be updated by the IPFIX packets. An attacker might
attempt to perform a replay of old IPFIX packets and
cause the white list to be corrupted. This threat would
result in legitimate traffic coming in from new routes
being detected as attacks and cause a self-inflicted DoS.
Protection against replay attacks can be achieved by the
use of timestamps or nonce to verify that an IPFIX
packet has been freshly generated. Alternatively, IPSec
could also prevent replay by the use of dynamic keying
if support for automatic key management is present.
6) Resource depletion attack on collector: Malicious flood-
ing of the collector with IPFIX packets to deplete
processing resources can be prevented if the collector
accepts IPFIX packets only from known authenticated
monitoring elements.
7) DDoS on Traceback’s components: Attackers might
carry out direct DDoS attacks on the Traceback’s com-
ponents, such as the monitoring elements and the col-
lector. DDoS detection and response mechanisms could
be used to protect these vital components. Alternatively,
techniques such as port hopping [39] could be used to
switch between port numbers at predefined time inter-
vals. Since security associations between the monitoring
elements and the collector would already have been set
up, it makes the computation of the current port number
feasible. Ports not in use could be closed while the one
which is dynamically computed and allocated could be
used for communication.
B. Limitations
1) Speed of detection mechanism: When the detection
mechanism detects the occurrence of a DDoS attack,
Traceback is triggered to stop the learning process and
start the tracing back to the entry points where the attack
traffic is coming in. If this is not done quickly enough,
the white list would be corrupted with the information
from the attack traffic. Therefore, new entries are entered
into a buffer in the Traceback mechanism before being
allowed into the white list. New entries are allowed to
be transferred into the white list only after a time delay
to ensure that no attack traffic is present during this time
interval.
2) Speed of traceback: As Traceback is performed in real-
time (during the occurrence of an attack), it has to obtain
the results before the attack is over. If the attack is too
short, Traceback would be unable to complete if the
speed of tracing is not fast enough. A solution would
be to implement logging to store the attack information
to allow for traceback in the event of short attacks,
for accountability purposes and even for further post-
mortem analysis.
3) Across administrative borders: After Traceback within
the victim’s network domain has been performed, the
results could be passed on to the adjoining administrative
domain, from which the attack traffic is coming. The
results could be used for that domain to carry out
further tracing back or simply for informative purpose.
The forms of communications to be used could be se-
cured emails, phone calls or authenticated and encrypted
packets to protect the integrity and confidentiality of
the data. The choice of the form of communication
would depend on the time of the attack, if near real-
time informing is required and whether an automated
information or triggering system and secure link has
been set up between the two networks.
VIII. RELATED WORK
In the IP logging scheme, the network routers log the
passage of all IP packets. The key challenge here lies in the po-
tentially huge amount of information storage requirement. For
example, if a router were to log all the packets in its entirety,
each OC-192 link at 1.25 GB/s at the router requires 75 GB of
storage for a 1-minute query buffer. The storage requirement
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quickly becomes prohibitive as the number of router links
increases. One solution, SPIE (Source Path Isolation Engine)
[4], has been proposed for IP version 4. The mechanism is
designed to identify the true source of a particular IP packet
given a copy of the packet to be traced and an approximate
time of receipt. In order to take care of the transformation
of packets as they are routed from source to destination, the
mechanism identified the invariant portions of the 20-byte IPv4
header. The fields that are susceptible to changes include: TOS
(Type of Service), TTL (Time to Live), Checksum and Options
field. The logging is based on the invariant portion of the IP
header and the first 8 bytes of payload. Based on the statistics
collected, the 28-byte prefix described above results in a rate
of collision of approximately 0.00092% in WANs and 0.139%
in LANs. To further reduce the storage requirement, instead
of storing the entire 28-byte prefix, hashing is performed,
followed by Bloom filter processing [40]. This reduces the
memory storage requirement in the router to 0.5% of link
bandwidth per unit time. The disadvantage is that using both
the packets’ digest (instead of the full packet) and hashing
to reduce storage requirement increases the risk of incurring
false positives.
In IP marking [5], [9]–[11], [13], [14] schemes, the interme-
diate routers mark the IP packets with additional information
so that the victim can use them to determine the attack path.
Approaches proposed include node append, node sampling
and edge sampling. The node append mechanism is similar
to the IP Record Route Option [41], in that the addresses
of successive routers traversed by IP packets are appended
to the packets. The victim can thus traceback the source of
such attack packets easily. However, this method introduces
very high overhead in terms of router processing and packet
space. The node sampling approach reduces such overhead by
the probabilistic marking of IP packets. The edge sampling
approach, as its name implies, marks an edge of the network
topology, traversed by the IP packets, instead of just the node.
As the IP marking algorithms put the marking information
in the Identification field of the IP header, IP marking has
an inherent disadvantage in that it “corrupts” the packets by
making changes to them during transit and also affects the
processing of the IP packets (for example, the Identification
field is used for fragmentation purpose). The standardization of
the IP marking schemes is thus unlikely due to this problem.
In the ICMP Traceback mechanism [6]–[8], [12], a new
ICMP message type, ICMP Traceback (ITrace), is designed
to carry information on routes that an IP packet has taken. IP
Marking requires overloading some fields in the IP header,
which raises the backward protocol compatibility problem.
ICMP Traceback utilizes out-of-band messaging to achieve
packet tracing and therefore overcomes IP marking’s problem.
As an IP packet passes through a router, an ICMP Traceback
message (ITrace) is generated with a low probability of about
1/20000 for the IP packet and sent to the same destination.
Assuming that the average maximum diameter of the Internet
is 20 hops, this probability value is to set the upper bound to
the net increase in the traffic overhead to 0.1%. This ITrace
message is then sent randomly, with a certain probability, to
the destination or to the origin of the IP packet. In the event
of a DDoS attack, the destination node can then use it to
traceback the attack path. The disadvantage of this scheme
is that additional traffic overhead will be incurred due to the
traceback messages propagating along the routes to the victim.
During an attack, this additional load would be undesirable.
In addition, all these existing traceback schemes require
wide-spread changes to and deployment on Internet routers.
Unless standardization is in place, it will be a long and
difficult process for everyone to decide on the scheme to
implement. These schemes also rely heavily on the detection
mechanism not just to trigger traceback but also to provide
them with the original packet for its route to be traced. This
requires the detection mechanism to identify attack packets
or an attack signature. The IP marking and ICMP Traceback
schemes also rely on the victim to receive and construct the
traceback path information. This might be a burden on the
victim which is already under a DDoS attack. IP marking also
require changes to be made to the original data packets and
overwriting essential fields might corrupt the original packets.
In contrast, our approach provides a means for performing
traceback in a non-intrusive way. Changes to the Internet
routers are not required. Constraints are not placed on the
detection mechanism to provide it with precise information
regarding the attack. The logging and computation tasks are
shifted to the WL caching devices and Traceback Manager,
relieving the victim from additional burden. Changes to the
original data packets are also not required. As the learning
phase is conducted before the attack, once the attack is
detected, mismatch checking can be conducted at once to
determine routers carrying attack traffic. Our algorithm is also
simple and efficient, allowing for a fast generation of the attack
graph and is scalable due to the distribution of processing
workload.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new non-intrusive traceback
technique based on the rationale that packets relating to a
particular source-destination flow follow a relatively static
path through routers. If an attacker spoofs a legitimate user’s
address, an “incorrect” path can then be detected. Our trace-
back mechanism builds caches of valid source addresses
(white list generation) for routers at distributed WL caching
devices, performs the construction of the attack graph within
an administrative domain, and provides an extension for inter-
domain support to identify the network point nearest to the
attack source.
We proposed two approaches to the Non-Intrusive IP
Traceback scheme, namely the Network Segmentation Based
(NSB) and Strategic Points Based (SPB) approach. The first
approach divides the network into different segments with a
WL caching device responsible for each. The second cuts
down the number of routers to be monitored and only focuses
on the strategic points within the network. Therefore, SPB
is able to achieve the traceback objective while reducing the
work load and overhead. Simulations were conducted based
on SPB performing traceback to locate routers carrying attack
traffic. The sampling rate was set to 0.01. Routers forwarding
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attack packets were successfully located by our traceback
scheme in 140ms, 80ms and 70ms for attack rate of 20, 50
and 100 pkts/sec, respectively. We also observed that as the
attack rate increases, the detection is faster and the difference
in the number of mismatch packets from attack and new
legitimate traffic increases due to differences in generation
rate. This allows a threshold to be set to ignore low rates
of new legitimate traffic.
We implemented our traceback scheme in C++ and inte-
grated it as a response module in the DARE system. The
system is deployed in Emulab to perform more realistic ex-
periments to measure the accuracy and speed of our traceback
scheme. We conducted a few sets of experiments with close
results and presented two sets of them. In a TCP SYN attack
scenario, we were able to obtain correct traceback results and
achieve traceback speed of 2 secs and 6 secs. The results
showed that our scheme is able to achieve traceback accuracy
and efficiency in a near real attack scenario.
Due to the differences in the way our system and the
other existing traceback techniques are triggered, quantita-
tive analysis and comparison are not practical. However, we
presented a qualitative analysis comparing our scheme with
other traceback techniques. Our approach is non-intrusive,
not requiring any changes to be made to the Internet routers
and precise information regarding the attack is not required
so we can use a wide variety of DDoS attack detection
techniques. The logging and computation tasks are shifted
to the WL caching devices and Traceback Manager, and
therefore relieving the victim from additional burden. Changes
to the original data packets are also not required. As the
learning phase is conducted before the attack, once the attack
is detected, mismatch checking can be conducted at once to
determine routers carrying attack traffic. Our algorithm is also
simple and efficient, allowing for a fast generation of the attack
graph and is scalable due to the distribution of processing
workload.
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